The Houthis launched a missile at central Israel on May 4, which caused an explosion near Israel’s Ben-Gurion International Airport. This led to some airlines cancelling flights. Clearly, a missile, or a missile fragment, or even fragments of an interceptor, falling near a major airport is a strategic threat. Israel has generally allowed the Houthis to launch long-range missiles at Israel over the last 12 months, assuming they will be intercepted. While Israel launched a handful of retaliatory raids using warplanes in 2024, it has basically stepped aside since the US launched airstrikes on March 15. The US campaign against the Houthis involves at least two aircraft carriers now.
The attack on May 4 could be a game-changer. Israeli politicians have issued the usual threats. However, it’s not clear if the Houthis can be easily stopped or deterred. What do we know about this challenge? First of all, we need to know more about the Houthis.
For more than 10 years, the Iranian-backed Houthis have been able to surprise the Middle East with their capabilities. The group burst onto the scene in Yemen, transforming a poor group of rebels into a major challenge to the security of the region. They threatened to take the major port city of Aden, and this led Saudi Arabia to lead a number of countries to intervene in Yemen.
Newly recruited fighters who joined a Houthi military force intended to be sent to fight in support of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, march during a parade in Sanaa, Yemen December 2, 2023. (credit: REUTERS/KHALED ABDULLAH)
Saudia Arabia intervenes with the Houthis
The Saudis began their intervention in 2015. The intervention was backed by the UAE, Sudan, Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan, among other states. Most of the states that backed the intervention did not supply many troops or military assets. Saudi Arabia and the UAE did most of the heavy lifting, but their differing views on what to do in Yemen also led to challenges in terms of how to contain or push back the Houthis. In theory, they were backing the official government of Yemen. It’s worth noting that Yemen itself is divided between the Houthi-controlled mountain areas around Sana’a and other parts of Yemen in Aden and areas to the east of Aden. The area east of Aden along the Gulf of Aden is historically South Yemen. The areas the Houthis control is historically called North Yemen. Between 1962 and 1990, these areas were divided.
The Houthis resided in the mountains, and because they are a form of Shi’ite Muslims called Zaydis, they increasingly had connections to Iran in the lead-up to 2015. This included Iranian export of technology for missiles and drones. Eventually, the Houthis created a ballistic missile and drone program that enabled them to threaten attacks deep into Saudi Arabia. Between 2015 and 2018, a total of 83 ballistic missiles were fired at Saudi Arabia. The intervention that the Saudis led in March 22015 was probably expected to be a cake-walk. However, it got bogged down. In 2017, the Houthis attacked a Saudi naval vessel. Also, in 2017, US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley showed off a Houthi ballistic missile and noted the connection to the Iranians that was clear from the technology.
By 2020, reports at the UN and Conflict Armament Research concluded that the Iranians were deeply involved in the Houthi drone program. Components of the Houthis’ drones and missiles were put on display in Saudi Arabia and later in the US. US officials privately called the display of the Houthi weapons a “petting zoo” because of all the drones and equipment that were shipped over.
The problem for the Saudis was that, despite increased knowledge about the Houthis using Iranian systems, Riyadh couldn’t bring the enemy to heel. The Saudis innovated and used F-15s to shoot down Houthi drones. Saudi air defenses took out ballistic missiles. But it wasn’t enough. The Houthis kept advancing in Yemen and kept consolidating power. By 2022, there was a fragile truce in Yemen. China, which has increasingly close ties to Iran, likely helped Saudi Arabia extricate itself from the conflict. It brokered a deal that let the Saudis and Iranians in 2023. The Yemen conflict then died down, and it’s clear that Saudi-Iran reconciliation likely was part of this. It’s worth recalling that back in 2019, the Iranians had attacked Saudi Arabia using drones and cruise missiles. They also attacked ships in the Gulf of Oman. They used the Houthis, who also threaten the Gulf. This was a dry run for how they would use the Houthis against Israel.
With the Saudis out of the picture, the Houthis consolidated power in 2023, and after the Hamas attack, they transitioned to attacking Israel. They began with drones and missile threats and expanded to attacks on shipping. The Houthis had already acquired the Shahed 136 from Iran, likely as early as 2020. The same drone was then exported by Iran to Russia. The Houthis were able to extend the range of their drones and missiles beyond 2,000km so they could reach Israel. In November 2023, the Houthis hijacked the Galaxy Leader ship, which they claimed was linked to Israel. They then turned it into a tourist attraction. This was brazen. The crew, all foreign nationals, were released in 2025. The ship is still held.
The Houthis were able to withstand the Saudis and the Saudi-led coalition for seven years. They withstood the US-backed Prosperity Guardian campaign that was supposed to protect shipping in the Red Sea in 2024. They increased attacks on Israel in the fall and winter of 2024. Israel responded several times. However, the Houthis kept up their threats. They briefly stopped attacking during the ceasefire in Gaza from January to March. When the US began strikes on March 15 and Israel began strikes on Gaza on March 18, the Houthis began their attacks again. They launched four missiles in three days; two on May 2, one on May 3, and one on May 4.
The Houthis still have a missile capability. It’s difficult to hunt down missiles that are wheeled out of caves in mountains. It’s hard in general to find mobile missile launchers. During the so-called Great Scud Hunt during the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam’s Scud launchers mostly avoided the US-led Coalition. This is part of a long history that shows that groups like the Houthis can withstand an airport. The Vietnamese, for instance, were able to move artillery across Laos and Cambodia and into position to strike the US in Vietnam. They also defeated the French in Vietnam at Dienbienphu in a similar manner. The fact that they didn’t have air power didn’t stop them. The Russians in Afghanistan suffered similarly.
The Houthis are a hard nut to crack. Air power likely isn’t enough to stop them. Can the supply lines be cut off? Can the rocket storage facilities be found? Possible. Time will tell if there is a way to deter them. Clearly, in the past, Iran has had some say over their actions, even if Iran distanced itself from them in March when the US began bombing. This is because Iran wants a new deal with Washington and doesn’t want to be held to account for the Houthis. It’s possible that any illegal Iranian shipments to the Houthis have been harmed by the massive recent explosion at the Shahid Rajaee port.
The Houthis have claimed various missile capabilities. In June 2024, they claimed they had a new solid-fuel rocket they called “Palestine.” They claim this is a two-stage missile with “hypersonic” capabilities. Solid-fuel rockets can be deployed faster than liquid-fueled rockets. The Houthis have also used the liquid-fueled Qiam and Ghader missiles, the latter of which is a version of the Iranian Shahab-3, according to an article at the BESA Center.
The Houthis know history. In the 1960s, the North Yemen Mutawakkallite Kingdom was successful at resisting an Egyptian invasion of Yemen. The Egyptians were backing the Yemen Arab Republic, which was based along the coast in areas like the port of Hodeida on the Red Sea. The Royalist forces of the Kingdom held the mountains and, at the time, were backed by the Saudis and others. The war dragged on until 1970. The more modern Egyptian forces were not able to dislodge the Royalists in the mountains, much like in 2015, the more modern Saudi forces were not able to dislodge the Houthis. There is a bit of an aside here regarding Israel. Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt was so tied down in the war in Yemen that it likely contributed to his defeat at the hands of Israel in the 1960s. Iran isn’t tied down in Yemen, though, so it’s not clear what will become of the Houthi threat.
